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Abstract
By virtue of the Customs Courts Act of 1980 (the “1980 Act”),’ the U.S. Court of International
Trade (the ”CIT”) was granted new and exclusive jurisdiction over certain actions commenced
by the United States, including actions ”’to recover upon a bond relating to the importation of
merchandise.” As a result of the 1980 legislation, the CIT became the new forum for suits instituted
by the United States to collect liquidated damages which had been assessed by the U.S. Customs
Service (”Customs”) against, an importer and/or its surety for breach of the terms of an importation
bond. This Article shall concentrate upon five of the claims and defenses considered by the CIT
and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and will include a discussion of several of
the related unresolved issues that have recently emerged. The specific issues that will be focused
upon are: 1. Whether the assessment of liquidated damages is a protestable decision within the
meaning of 19 U.S.C. §1514(a), and if so, whether the failure to protest within ninety days of the
demand for damages precludes the challenging of the assessment of those damages as a defense to
a collection suit by the U.S. government. 2. Whether the event that commences the running of the
statute of limitations in suits to recover liquidated damages for breach of the bond is the date of
the actual breach, or the date of the mailing of the demand for payment of the liquidated damages
. 3. Whether liquidation of an entry affects the bond obligations of an importer and surety in a suit
based upon failure to timely redeliver, export or destroy foodstuffs and/or motor vehicles. Whether
liquidated damages assessed for breach of a bond function as a penalty for purposes of the statute
of limita- tions and/or the awarding of prejudgment interest. 5. Whether prejudgment interest
should ordinarily run from the date of the first demand for payment of the liquidated damages.
THE LAND OF LIQUIDATED DAMAGES:
RECENT JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND
UNRESOLVED ISSUESt
Barbara M. Epstein*
It is the year 1980. Picture if you will, a fairly barren land-
scape, littered with only a few rocks and potholes.
Enter a score of litigious travellers, tripping and stumbling
into and over the obstacles, and followed by a few judicious
persons, attempting to repair, shape, and recondition the
land.
Welcome to the "land of liquidated damages."
INTRODUCTION
By virtue of the Customs Courts Act of 1980 (the "1980
Act"),' the U.S. Court of International Trade (the "CIT") was
granted new and exclusive jurisdiction over certain actions
commenced by the United States, 2 including actions "'to re-
cover upon a bond relating to the importation of merchan-
dise."13 As a result of the 1980 legislation, the CIT became the
new forum for suits instituted by the United States to collect
liquidated damages which had been assessed by the U.S. Cus-
toms Service ("Customs") against, an importer and/or its
surety for breach of the terms of an importation bond.4
t This Article is adapted from a paper submitted to the Sixth Annual Judicial
Conference of the U.S. Court of International Trade on November 3, 1989. The
paper formed the basis for the Author's participation in a panel discussion at that
conference.
* Trial Attorney, International Trade Field Office, Civil Division, Commercial
Litigation Branch, U.S. Department of Justice. The views expressed in this Article
are solely those of the Author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S.
Department of Justice.
1. Codified at scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (1988) [hereinafter the 1980 Act].
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1582 (providing that CIT "shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any
civil action which arises out of an import transaction and which is commenced by the
United States").
3. Id. § 1582(2). The CIT has "jurisdiction . . . to hear collection cases, i.e.,
recoveries on a bond." H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1979).
4. When merchandise arrives in the United States, a bond, executed by the im-
porter and a surety, is usually required by the U.S. Customs Service ("Customs") in
order for the merchandise to be released from Customs' custody. The notice of final
rule revised the Customs bond structure and indicates that the importation bond is
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This Article shall concentrate upon five of the claims and
defenses considered by the CIT and the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, and will include a discussion of several
of the related unresolved issues that have recently emerged.
The specific issues that will be focused upon are:
1. Whether the assessment of liquidated damages is a
protestable decision within the meaning of 19 U.S.C.
§ 1514(a), and if so, whether the failure to protest within
ninety days of the demand for damages precludes the challeng-
ing of the assessment of those damages as a defense to a col-
lection suit by the U.S. government.5  .
2. Whether the event that commences the running of the
statute of limitations in suits to recover liquidated damages for
breach of the bond is the date of the actual breach, or the date
of the mailing of the demand for payment of the liquidated
damages .6
3. Whether liquidation of an entry affects the bond obli-
gations of an importer and surety in a suit based upon failure
to timely redeliver, export or destroy foodstuffs and/or motor
vehicles.'
4. Whether liquidated damages assessed for breach of a
bond function as a penalty for purposes of the statute of limita-
tions and/or the awarding of prejudgment interest.8
5. Whether prejudgment interest should ordinarily run
from the date of the first demand for payment of the liquidated
intended to promote compliance with several requirements, including the timely en-
try of documentation; the payment of estimated duties when due; the payment of any
additional duties and taxes subsequently found to be due; and the timely redelivery
of merchandise to Customs' custody if found not to comply with applicable laws and
regulations, including those requiring that the merchandise be properly marked, la-
beled, cleaned, fumigated, destroyed, or exported. T.D. 84-213, 49 Fed. Reg. 41,152
(1984). In the event merchandise is not timely redelivered to Customs' custody, liq-
uidated damages are assessed.
5. See infra notes 29-55 and accompanying text (discussing protestable decision
issue).
6. See infra notes 56-78 and accompanying text (analyzing event which triggers
statute of limitations).
7. See infra notes 79-90 and accompanying text (discussing effect of liquidation
on bond liability).
8. See infra notes 91-104 and accompanying text (analyzing distinction between
damages and penalties).
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damages. 9
TYPICAL CIT SCENARIOS
Although liquidated damages are assessed by Customs in
various contexts,' 0 two scenarios have been most frequently
encountered by the CIT in suits involving the collection of liq-
uidated damages for breach of a bond.
Scenario (1)
A motor vehicle is entered into the United States that does
not meet the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (the
"EPA") emission standards" and/or the U.S. Department of
Transportation's (the "DOT") safety standards.' 2 The vehicle
is released to the importer, conditioned upon the importer's
declaration that the vehicle will be brought into conformity
within a given amount of time.' 3 The importer submits an Im-
9. See infra notes 105-21 and accompanying text (discussing prejudgment inter-
est issue).
10. An example, in addition to the assessment of liquidated damages for breach
of an importation bond, is the assessment of damages for breach of a performance
bond by a bonded carrier and/or bonded cartage or lighterage operator.
11. Customs regulations provide that certain motor vehicles offered for impor-
tation into the United States are subject to emission standards prescribed by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (the "EPA") or the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services under section 202 of the Clean Air Act. 19 C.F.R. § 12.73 (1990).
12. Customs regulations provide that motor vehicles and motor vehicle equip-
ment manufactured on or afterJanuary 1, 1968 and offered for importation into the
United States are subject to federal motor vehicle safety standards prescribed by the
Secretary of Transportation under sections 103 and 119 of the National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1392 & 1407 (1988); 19 C.F.R.
§ 12.80(a) (1990).
13. Customs regulations provide in essence that a vehicle offered for importa-
tion into the United States shall be denied entry unless the importer or consignee
files with the entry a declaration stating that the vehicle conforms to all applicable
emission and safety standards or that it does not meet all applicable emission and
safety standards, but that it will be brought into conformity with the EPA emission
standards within ninety days of entry and with the DOT safety standards within 120
days (or up to 180 days, if authorized by the Administrator of the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (the "NHTSA")). 19 C.F.R. §§ 12.73 & 12.80 (1990).
With respect to the EPA emission standards, a declaration must be provided to
the district director of Customs within ninety days of entry (or longer, if extended by
Customs), stating that the vehicle is in conformity. If the declaration is not timely
provided, the vehicle must be redelivered to Customs within a given time. With re-
spect to the DOT safety standards, the importer must submit proof of conformity to
the Administrator of the NHTSA, and state that the vehicle will not be sold until the
NHTSA issues an approval letter to the district director of Customs, stating that the
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mediate Delivery and Consumption Entry Bond (the
"Bond"),' 4 under which the importer and surety jointly and
severally promise to pay liquidated damages to Customs (1)
after a proper demand for redelivery has been made by Cus-
toms, and (2) upon demand for payment if the principal does
not timely redeliver the imported merchandise to Customs'
custody. 15
The vehicle is not timely brought into conformity, and
Customs, in its role of enforcing the EPA and DOT laws, issues
a notice of redelivery to the importer, ordering the importer to
redeliver the non-complying merchandise to Customs' custody
within a certain number of days. The importer fails to timely
redeliver the merchandise and, pursuant to the terms of the
bond 6 and Customs regulations, 7 Customs assesses liqui-
dated damages against the importer and its surety.' 8 A notice
and demand for liquidated damages is sent to the importer,
with a copy to the surety.' 9 The importer fails to comply with
the demand for payment, and a formal demand for liquidated
damages is subsequently sent to the surety.
Neither the importer nor surety pays the liquidated dam-
ages, and after mitigation proceedings are exhausted by the
importer and/or surety and administrative collection proceed-
ings are completed by Customs, the case is referred to the U.S.
vehicle has been brought into conformity. Customs cancels the bond when it re-
ceives the approval letter from the NHTSA. Id. § 12.80(e)(1). If the approval letter
is not received by Customs within 180 days after entry, the district director issues a
notice of redelivery, requiring the merchandise to be redelivered to Customs' cus-
tody. Id. §§ 12.80(e)(2) & 141.113. If the vehicle is not timely redelivered to Cus-
toms, liquidated damages are assessed and a notice for demand payment is issued.
Id. §§ 12.80(e) & 141.113(g).
14. Customs Form 7553 [hereinafter Bond].
15. Id. 8.
16. Id. 4. Paragraph 4 provides in relevant part:
[I]n default of redelivery after a proper demand on him, the above-bounden
principal shall pay to the said district director such amounts as liquidated
damages as may be demanded by him in accordance with the laws and regu-
lations not exceeding the amount of this obligation, for any breach or
breaches thereof ....
Id.
17. 19 C.F.R. §§ 12.73(c), 12.80(e)(2), & 141.113 (1990).
18. The amount of liquidated damages assessed in the cases discussed in this
Article is comprised of the sum of the amount of the value of the merchandise plus
estimated duties.
19. 19 C.F.R. §§ 141.113(g) & 172.1 (1990). The notice and demand for liqui-
dated damages is issued on Customs Form 5955A.
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Department ofJustice with a request that a suit be instituted to
collect the unpaid liquidated damages.2"
Scenario (2)
Foodstuffs that are imported into the United States are
subject to regulation by both Customs and the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (the "FDA"). Pursuant to the Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act (the "FDCA"), food may be released
to an importer under an immediate delivery and consumption
bond pending a decision by the FDA regarding its admissibil-
ity. 21 If the FDA determines that the food is not admissible, it
so advises Customs, which then sends a notice of refusal of ad-
mission ("notice of refusal") to the importer.22 The notice of
refusal states that the food is in violation of the FDCA, and
orders that the merchandise be exported or destroyed under
Customs' supervision within ninety days unless an extension of
time is granted. Customs regulations direct Customs to sus-
20. Several cases in the CIT have involved the collection of liquidated damages
for failure to redeliver a motor vehicle. See, e.g., Di Giorgio v. United States, 8 CIT
192 (1984); United States v. Atkinson, 575 F. Supp. 791 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983);
United States v. Bavarian Motors, Inc., 4 CIT 83 (1982).
21. 21 U.S.C. § 381 (1988). Section 381(b) provides:
Pending decision as to the admission of an article being imported or offered
for import, the Secretary of the Treasury may authorize delivery of such
article to the owner or consignee upon the execution by him of a good and
sufficient bond providing for the payment of such liquidated damages in the
event of default as may be required pursuant to regulations of the Secretary
of the Treasury.
Id. § 381 (b).
22. When foodstuffs are imported into the United States, the importer or its
customhouse broker generally advises the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (the
"FDA") of the entry before the merchandise arrives in port. The FDA then deter-
mines whether it is necessary to examine the imported merchandise. If the FDA de-
termines that examination of the food is unnecessary, it issues the importer a "may
proceed notice," which is filed with Customs and which alerts Customs that the FDA
has released the merchandise. If, on the other hand, the FDA determines, based
upon physical examination or past history of imports of a particular product, that the
merchandise may be violative of the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (the "FDCA"), it
issues a notice of sampling to the importer, requiring the importer to hold the mer-
chandise pending analysis of the sample and release by the FDA. If the food appears
contaminated, the importer is then sent a notice of detention and hearing by the
FDA, in which the importer is advised that its merchandise appears to be contami-
nated and should continue to be held intact pending final decision as to whether it
shall be admitted or refused admission. If the FDA determines the food is not admis-
sible, Customs issues a notice of refusal of admission ("notice of refusal") to the
importer.
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pend liquidation of the entry until a final determination as to
admissibility has been made. 3
In this scenario, however, which has been the subject of a
number of cases considered by the CIT and the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit,2 4 Customs liquidates the en-
try, thereby fixing the amount of duty, prior to the issuance of
the notice of refusal. 5 If the merchandise is not exported or
destroyed within ninety days of the notice of refusal, Customs
assesses damages against the importer and surety on the
ground that paragraph 7 of the Bond26 is breached. 7 A notice
23. 19 C.F.R. § 159.55 (1990). Section 159.55 provides, in part, as follows:
Possible prohibited food, drugs, or other articles.
(a) Suspension of liquidation. The liquidation.., shall be suspended until it
is determined whether admission of the merchandise into the United States
is permitted under the law.
Id. § 159.55(a)..
24. See, e.g., United States v. Toshoku Am., Inc., 670 F. Supp. 1006 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1987), rev'd, 879 F.2d 815 (Fed. Cir. 1989); United States v. Utex Int'l, Inc.,
659 F. Supp. 250 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987), rev'd, 857 F.2d 1408 (Fed. Cir. 1988); United
States v. Angelakos, 688 F. Supp. 636 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988), dismissed on remand (Ct.
Int'l Trade Nov. 15, 1990); United States v. Lun May Co., 680 F. Supp. 1573 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1988), dismissed on remand (Ct. Int'l Trade Feb. 28, 1990); United States v. Con-
tinental Seafoods, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 1481 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987), vacated and dismissed
per stipulation on remand (Ct. Int'l Trade Nov. 30, 1988); United States v. American
Motorists Ins. Co., 680 F. Supp. 1569 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987), appeal dismissed (Fed. Cir.
1988).
25. Liquidation constitutes the final computation or ascertainment of the duties
or drawback accruing on an entry. 19 C.F.R. § 159.1 (1990); see Ambassador Div. of
Florsheim Shoe v. United States, 748 F.2d 1560, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
A failure to suspend liquidation permits the importer and others authorized to
file protests under 19 U.S.C. § 1514 to file a timely protest seeking to invalidate the
liquidation. See United States v. A. N. Deringer, Inc., 593 F.2d 1015 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
No corresponding right to protest exists for the U.S. government. Thus, if the im-
porter does not file a protest, the liquidation becomes final. Arguably, the importer
waives any right to complain about the premature liquidation with respect to liqui-
dated damages.
26. Paragraph 7 of the Bond provides as follows:
And if in the case of any and all merchandise found not to comply with the
law and regulations governing its admission into the commerce of the
United States, the above-bounden principal after proper notice shall mark,
label, clean, fumigate, destroy, export, and do any and all other things in
relation to said merchandise that may be lawfully required, and shall hold
the said merchandise for inspection and examination . . . ; or in default
thereof, shall pay to the district director of customs as liquidated damages
an amount equal to the value of the merchandise with respect to which there
has been a default, as set forth in the entry, plus the estimated duties
thereon, as determined at the time of entry.
Bond, supra note 14, 7.
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and demand for liquidated damages is sent to the importer and
surety, and subsequent to unsuccessful mitigation and collec-
tion proceedings, suit is instituted by the U.S. government to
collect the liquidated damages.28
The two scenarios described above have provided a fertile
field for the growth of numerous controversial claims and de-
fenses relating to the assessment of liquidated damages.
I. THE RIGHT TO PROTEST THE ASSESSMENT OF
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
Pursuant to the statutory scheme governing judicial review
of Customs decisions, a Customs decision, order or finding
that is encompassed by section 1514(a) must be protested
within ninety days of that decision or the decision is final and
conclusive for purposes of obtaining judicial review. 29 Assum-
27. While scenario 2 is representative of the fact pattern involved in many of the
cases discussed in this Article, the appellate court in Toshoku recently held that a suit
based upon the failure to export or destroy in compliance with a notice of refusal is
governed by paragraph 4 of the Bond, not paragraph 7. Toshoku, 879 F.2d at 819-20;
see supra note 16 (setting forth text of paragraph 4 of Bond); supra note 26 (containing
text of paragraph 7 of Bond). Inasmuch as paragraph 4 provides that liquidated
damages be assessed if the importer fails to comply with a demand for redelivery (as
opposed to a notice of refusal), it appears that Toshoku requires, absent circumstances
not discussed here, that a demand for redelivery be sent to the importer as a condi-
tion precedent to a suit to collect damages for the failure to comply with the notice of
refusal. See generally Toshoku, 879 F.2d 815. Thus, it appears that under Toshoku, sce-
nario 2 would be changed to the extent that subsequent to the failure to export or
destroy the. merchandise within the ninety days permitted by the notice of refusal, a
demand for redelivery to Customs' custody would also be issued. Liquidated dam-
ages would not be assessed until the time expired to comply with the demand for
redelivery.
28. Several cases instituted under 28 U.S.C. § 1582(2) have involved the failure
to redeliver and/or export or to destroy foodstuffs. See, e.g., Toshoku, .670 F. Supp.
1006; Utex, 659 F. Supp. 250; Imperial Food, 660 F. Supp. 958; Angelakos, 688 F. Supp.
636; Lun May, 680 F. Supp. 1573; Continental Seafoods, 672 F. Supp. 1481; American
Motorists, 680 F. Supp. 1569; United States v. India Food and Gourmet, 9 CIT 171
(1985).
29. 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a) (1988). Section 1514(a) provides as follows:
[D]ecisions of the appropriate customs officer, including the legality of all
orders and findings entering into the same, as to
(1) the appraised value of merchandise;
(2) the classification and rate and amount of duties chargeable;
(3) all charges or exactions of whatever character within the jurisdiction of
the Secretary of the Treasury;
(4) the exclusion of merchandise from entry or delivery or a demand for
redelivery to customs custody under any provision of the customs laws, ex-
cept a determination appealable under section 1337 of this title;
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ing a timely protest is filed and denied, ° judicial review of a
protestable decision may be obtained by payment of all liqui-
dated duties, charges or exactions, and commencement of a
civil action within 180 days of the mailing of the notice of the
denial of the protest.3 1
It is well settled that challenges to the legality of a protest-
able decision, such as the assessment of import duties, may not
be raised either affirmatively or as a defense in an enforcement
action by the U.S. government to collect the import duties un-
less a timely protest has been filed.3 2 Thus, in answering the
(5) the liquidation or reliquidation of an entry, or any modification thereof;
(6) the refusal to pay a claim for drawback; and
(7) the refusal to reliquidate an entry under section 1520(c) of this title,
shall be final and conclusive upon all persons (including the United States
and any officer thereof) unless a protest is filed in accordance with this sec-
tion, or unless a civil action contesting the denial of a protest, in whole or in
part is commenced in the United States Court of International Trade in ac-
cordance with chapter 169 of title 28 within the time prescribed by section
2636 of that title [within 180 days of the mailing of the notice of the denial
of the protest].
Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 2636 (1988).
Furthermore, section 1514(c)(2) provides that
[a] protest of a decision, order, or finding described in subsection (a) of this
section shall be filed with such customs officer within ninety days after but
not before-
(A) notice of liquidation or reliquidation, or
(B) in circumstances where subparagraph (a) is inapplicable, the date of the
decision as to which protest is made.
A protest by a surety which has an unsatisfied legal claim under its bond may
be filed within 90 days from the date of mailing of notice of demand for
payment against its bond ....
19 U.S.C. § 1514(c)(2) (1988). Thus, pursuant to this subsection, a surety may also
file a protest within ninety days of the date of the mailing of the notice of the first
formal demand for payment against its bond, as well as within ninety days of the
initial notice of liquidated damages which was issued to the importer, with a copy to
the surety. d.
30. Recently a question was raised, albeit informally, by an attorney for an im-
porter, concerning the event which starts the protest clock running if the importer
wants to protest the decision to assess the liquidated damages. In light of the lan-
guage of section 1514(c)(2), it was argued that the decision to assess damages may be
protested by the importer and surety within ninety days of the first notice of demand
for payment that is sent to the importer (with a copy to the surety), and that the
surety has the additional right of protesting within ninety days of the first formal
demand for payment sent directly to the surety. It is this second notice that advises
the surety that the importer has not paid. 19 U.S.C. § 1514(c)(2) (1988). For the
text of section 1514(c)(2), see supra note 29.
31. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2636 & 2637(a) (1988); see 19 C.F.R. §§ 174.1-174.32 (1990).
32. See Westray v. United States, 85 U.S. 322 (1873); United States v. Desiree
Int'l U.S.A., Ltd., 497 F. Supp. 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); United States v. Earnshaw, 12 F.
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issue of whether the assessment is encompassed in section
1514(a), one must first determine whether the assessment of
liquidated damages must be timely protested in order to ob-
tain judicial review of the legality of that decision.
Based upon fifty years ofjudicial decisions suggesting that
the assessment of liquidated damages is a charge or exaction
within the meaning of section 1514(a)(3), 3 the U.S. govern-
ment has taken the position in a number of the collection cases
instituted under section 1582(2) that the assessment of liqui-
dated damages is a protestable decision, and therefore cannot
be challenged affirmatively or defensively absent the filing of a
timely protest. In other words, absent the filing of a timely
protest, the right to dispute the legality of the assessment of
the liquidated damages expires with the passage of the protest
period. This contention that the filing of a timely protest is a
prerequisite to raising any substantive defenses in a collection
suit by the U.S. government with respect to assessment of liq-
uidated damages drew, at best, a "lukewarm" response from
the CIT which declined to take a definitive stand on the issue.34
283 (S.D.N.Y. 1882); Watt v. United States, 29 F. Cas. 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1878) (No.
17,292); United States v. Cousinery, 25 F. Cas. 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1874) (No. 14,878).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Bavarian Motors, Inc., 4 CIT 83, 85 (1982) (stating
that "demand against a surety for payment [of liquidated damages] against its bond
gives rise to a right to protest that decision"); St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v.
United States, 1 CIT 283 (1981) (citing Alberta Gas Chems., Inc. v. Blumenthal, 467
F. Supp. 1245, 1249-50 (Cust. Ct. 1979)) (stating that "terms 'charges or exactions'
have been applied to actual assessments of specific sums of money (other than ordi-
nary customs duties) on imported merchandise"); Schieffelin & Co. v. United States,
294 F. Supp. 53 (Cust. Ct. 1968); Huber v. United States, 29 Cust. Ct. 92 (1952), rev'd
on other grounds, 41 C.C.P.A. 69 (1953); United States v. Frank F. Smith & Co., T.D.
49,267, 25 C.C.P.A. 163 (1937); Bush & Co. v. United States, 71 Treas. Dec. 852,
T.D. 48,992 (1937) (noting that demand for liquidated damages for failure to export,
where damages demanded were sum of value of merchandise plus duty, is exaction,
protestable within then exclusive jurisdiction of Customs Court); see also United
States v. Uniroyal, Inc., 687 F.2d 467, 470 n.9 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (recognizing various
ways to obtain judicial review of Customs' "marking" decision, including protesting
assessment of liquidated damages); Carlingswitch, Inc. v. United States, 500 F. Supp.
223 (Cust. Ct. 1980), aff'd, 651 F.2d 768 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (stating that under section
1514(a)(3), charge or exaction applies to actual assessments on imported merchan-
dise and not Customs' refusal voluntarily to refund tendered money).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Angelakos, 688 F. Supp. 636, 638 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1988) (declining to resolve protest issue on ground that it is "complicated issue in-
volving seemingly conflicting precedents"), dismissed on remand (Ct. Int'l Trade Nov.
15, 1990); United States v. Continental Seafoods, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 1481, 1484 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1987) (stating that "while § 1514(a) operates to prevent specified parties
from invoking the Court's jurisdiction, as an initial matter, to contest decisions not
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Then came the Federal Circuit's decision in United States v. Utex
International, Inc. ," which partially resolved the issue.
A. The Filing of a Timely Protest Is Not a Prerequisite to Defending
Against a Claim by the U.S. Government
Utex involved a fact pattern similar to that in scenario 2.36
A default judgment had been issued against the importer and
summary judgment had been granted by the trial court in favor
of the United States against the surety on the bond. 7 The
surety's primary defense was that its bond liability, which had
been incurred as a result of the importer's failure to export or
destroy contaminated shrimp, had terminated because the en-
try had been liquidated by Customs prior to the issuance of a
notice of refusal by the FDA and Customs.38
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit re-
versed the CIT's judgment and held that the prior liquidation
did, indeed, terminate the surety's obligation.3 9 The Federal
Circuit also addressed the issue of whether the surety's failure
to protest the assessment or demand for the liquidated dam-
ages precluded it from defensively contesting the U.S. govern-
ment's demand for those damages in a collection suit. The
Utex court, per Judge Newman, held that
[iun a suit for damages brought by the government, it ap-
pears clear that historically the surety was not required to
file a protest and pay the full demanded damages in ad-
vance, in order to preserve its right to defend on the issue
of liability.
We conclude that the 1980 legislative enactments did
not change the right of the surety to defend against a claim
for liquidated damages. Under the circumstances that here
timely protested, it is less obvious that the statute acts as a prophylactic against the
attempt to raise issues defensively"), vacated and dismissed per stipulation on remand (Ct.
Int'l Trade Nov. 30, 1988); United States v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 680 F.
Supp. 1569, 1571 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987) (declining to resolve protest issue), appeal
dismissed (Fed. Cir. 1988); United States v. Utex Int'l, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 250, 253 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1987) (stating, in dicta, that surety had "right to protest the demand for
liquidated damages"), rev'd, 857 F.2d 1408 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
35. 857 F.2d 1408 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
36. See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text (outlining typical events of sce-
nario 2).
37. Utex, 659 F. Supp. at 251 n.l.
38. Id. at 252.
39. Utex, 857 F.2d 1408.
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prevail the surety was not required to file an administrative
protest and pay the damages assessed, as prerequisites to
defending against the charge.4 °
The court acknowledged that decisions that are listed under
section 1514(a), such as the assessment of a duty, may not be
affirmatively or defensively challenged absent the filing of a
timely protest. 4'
The court then addressed the U.S. government's argu-
ment that the assessment of liquidated damages is a charge or
exaction, listed under section 1514(a), and is therefore a
protestable decision that may not be challenged defensively in
court unless the prerequisites to judicial review, such as the
filing of a timely protest, have been met. The Utex court re-
jected this argument, reasoning that all the decisions listed
under section 1514(a) related solely to liquidation, and the de-
cisions, orders or findings subsumed in the liquidation,42 and
that, since damages for breach do not relate to liquidation,
they cannot be within the meaning of section 1514(a).43 One
of the grounds, therefore, for the Utex court's decision that the
surety in that case was not precluded from raising substantive
defenses despite its failing to have filed a timely protest ap-
40. Id. at 1414.
41. Id. at 1409.
42. Id. The court failed to note that liquidation is a separately listed category
under section 1514(a)(5), and that the other six categories are separately and inde-
pendently protestable decisions. See, e.g., United States v. Uniroyal, Inc., 687 F.2d
467, 469-70 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (reaffirming that demand for redelivery under section
1514(a)(4) is separately protestable decision). Moreover, as recognized by the appel-
late court in Uniroyal, in the context of determining who was the "ultimate pur-
chaser" in a "marking" case, it is possible to obtain judicial review of a Customs
determination regarding "marking" by protesting the demand for redelivery or pro-
testing the assessment of liquidated damages in the event the merchandise is not
redelivered and damages are assessed. Id. at 470 n.9.
43. In Utex, the Federal Circuit noted the surety's contention that "the charges
and exactions comprehended in section 1514(a)(3) are the payments required to be
made in implementation of § 1514(a), but do not extend to damages for breach."
United States v. Utex Int'l, Inc., 857 F.2d 1408, 1413 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The Federal
Circuit then stated that support for this position was found in 28 U.S.C. § 2637(a),
which provides that a prerequisite to obtaining judicial review for a denial of a pro-
test is the payment of "liquidated duties, [denial] charges, or exactions" prior to the
commencement of the action, but does not expressly state that all liquidated dam-
ages must be paid. Id. The court's reasoning on this point appears somewhat circui-
tous, however, because if the assessment of liquidated damages is, in fact, a charge or
exaction, then such assessment is named in section 2637. See 28 U.S.C. § 2637
(1988).
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pears to be that the assessment of liquidated damages is not a
charge or exaction and thus not a protestable decision within
the meaning of section 1514(a).
A second and perhaps more significant basis for the
court's decision, however, is its finding that the pre-1980 col-
lection cases brought by the U.S. government to collect liqui-
dated damages in the district courts did not establish that sure-
ties had to file a protest in order to defend against a suit for
damages.44 Inasmuch as section 1582(2) was not intended to
change the right of the surety to defend against a claim for
liquidated damages, the court concluded that a surety was not
required to file a protest and pay the full demanded damages
in advance in order to preserve its fight to defend on the issue
of liability. 45
The Utex court's conclusion was reaffirmed by the Federal
Circuit in United States v. Toshoku America, Inc. ,46 which also re-
jected the contention that the importer and surety had waived
their right to challenge the legality of the demand for liqui-
dated damages because they had not filed a timely protest
against the assessment of the damages.4 7 The Toshoku court
said that
[iun [Utex], this court recently held, inter alia, that an assess-
ment of liquidated damages is not a 'charge or exaction'
that must be challenged by protest under 19 U.S.C. § 1514
(1982). Proof that the importer has complied with the con-
ditions of the bond has traditionally been and still remains a
complete defense to a collection suit brought on the
bond.48
Thus, the court affirmed the proposition that a Customs deci-
sion which is listed under section 1514(a) and which is indispu-
tably a protestable decision (such as liquidation) cannot be
challenged in court affirmatively or defensively absent the fil-
ing of a timely protest and compliance with the other statuto-
44. Utex, 857 F.2d at 1414. The Federal Circuit also held that "[it is not charac-
teristic of either the law of surety or the law of contracts that a defendant must rou-
tinely pay the amount demanded prior to judicial determination of contractual liabil-
ity. Absent statutory directive or clear Congressional intent to the contrary, we do
not impose it." Id.
45. Id.
46. 879 F.2d 815 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
47. Id. at 816 n.3.
48. Id. at 818.
1990-1991]
72 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 14:60
rily mandated prerequisites for obtaining judicial review. Utex
and Toshoku have also determined that, even absent a timely
protest and compliance with the other prerequisites forjudicial
review, the assessment and/or demand for liquidated damages
may be defensively challenged in a collection suit brought by
the U.S. government to recover those damages. 49
B. The Unresolved Protest Issue: Do the Importer and Surety Have
the Option of Obtaining Judicial Review of the Assessment
of Liquidated Damages?
A significant related issue not directly involved in Utex and
Toshoku is whether an importer or surety has the option of pro-
testing the assessment and/or demand for liquidated damages
in the event it elects to commence a suit in the CIT in order to
obtain judicial review of the legality of the decision to assess
the damages. In practice, when the importer and/or surety re-
ceive a notice and demand for liquidated damages, they clearly
have at least two methods of challenging the assessment,
neither of which requires payment of the damages in advance.
They may administratively petition for cancellation or mitiga-
tion of the damages, 50 or they may wait to be sued by the U.S.
government.
There may be reasons, however, why the importer and/or
surety might want expeditious judicial review of their legal
claims if they are not satisfied with the results of mitigation
proceedings. For example, there are procedures available to
Customs whereby sanctions may be brought against sureties
49. In Utex and Toshoku, no protest was filed against the assessment and/or de-
mand for liquidated damages. See generally United States v. Toshoku Am., Inc., 670 F.
Supp. 1006 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987), rev'd, 879 F.2d 815 (Fed. Cir. 1989); United States
v. Utex Int'l, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 250 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987), rev'd, 857 F.2d 1408 (Fed.
Cir. 1988). An interesting question recently raised by an attorney for a surety during
informal discussions is whether the Utex and Toshoku holding applies to the situation
where a timely protest is filed and denied, but no civil action is commenced within
180 days of that denial. In such a situation, have the importer and surety waived their
rights to challenge defensively the legality of the assessment? Should such a situa-
tion actually arise, the court will be faced with a subtle, but legally distinguishable,
variation of the protest question addressed by Utex and Toshoku. See supra note 25
(discussing liquidation, penalties, and failure to suspend liquidation).
50. 19 U.S.C. § 1618 (1988); see 19 C.F.R. §§ 162.31 & 171 (1990). If, however,
a supplemental petition for mitigation is denied and a second supplemental petition
for mitigation is filed, it must be accompanied by payment of the damages. Id.
§ 171.33(c)(1).
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who have significant outstanding claims. 5' Rather than ac-
cumulating significant debts under its bonds, therefore, a
surety might prefer to protest, pay the damages, and com-
mence an action for a refund in order to obtain rapid judicial
review. An importer and/or surety might also wish to secure
speedy judicial resolution of their claims in order to avoid the
accrual of pre-judgment interest in the event they fail to pre-
vail in a collection case brought by the U.S. government.52
The Utex and Toshoku decisions apparently resolved the
question of whether an importer and/or surety is barred from
defensively challenging the assessment of liquidated damages
absent a timely protest. Those decisions did not, however, in-
volve the issue of whether an importer and/or surety has the
option of protesting the assessment and/or demand for liqui-
dated damages in the event they elect affirmatively to com-
mence a suit in the CIT in order to obtain judicial review of
claims relating to the assessment.
Notwithstanding the apparent conclusion in Utex and
Toshoku that the assessment of liquidated damages is not a
charge or exaction for purposes of section 1514(a)(3) and
therefore not a protestable decision within the meaning of sec-
tion 1514(a), Utex also cites with approval the finding in Huber
v. United States,5 3 that an importer has the right to elect to pro-
test, pay the liquidated damages, and sue in the U.S. Customs
Court for a refund, or wait to be sued in the district court.54
Thus, despite the holding in Utex, the assessment of liqui-
dated damages may still be considered a charge or exaction for
51. See, e.g., 19 C.F.R. § 113.38 (1990); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Vil-
lanueva, 706 F. Supp. 923 (Ct. Int'l Trade), aff'd, 880 F.2d 409 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
52. See, e.g., United States v. Monza Automobili, 683 F. Supp. 818 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1988); United States v. Imperial Food Imports, 660 F. Supp. 958 (Ct. Int'l
Trade), aff'd, 834 F.2d 1013 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
53. 29 Cust. Ct. 92 (1952), rev'don other grounds, 41 C.C.P.A. 69 (1953).
54. United States v. Utex Int'l, Inc., 857 F.2d 1408, 1414 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In
Huber, the U.S. Customs Court found that liquidated damages assessed for breach of
a bond when the importer failed to redeliver merchandise pursuant to a demand for
redelivery was a protestable charge or exaction within the meaning of section 1514.
Huber, 29 Cust. Ct. at 100-02. The Customs Court held that a suit by the U.S. gov-
ernment for breach of a bond could, at that time, only be brought in the district
court. Id. The court noted, however, that the importer could bring its suit for a
refund of the liquidated damages in the Customs Court because (1) it was not suing
for breach of a bond, and (2) a charge or exaction was an expressly named protest-
able decision under section 1514. Id. at 103.
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purposes of affirmatively obtaining judicial review of the legal-
ity of the assessment. A determination that the assessment of
liquidated damages is a protestable decision for purposes of
obtaining affirmative judicial review of the denial of the protest
in the CIT would appear to have certain beneficial effects for
the U.S. government, the importer, and the surety.
The United States would benefit by having the claims paid
quickly and being spared the burden of collection and litiga-
tion proceedings. The importer and/or surety, while still hav-
ing the option of petitioning administratively for mitigation of
their claims or waiting to be sued, could also protest, 55 thereby
preserving their right to expeditious judicial review in the
event their claims are not mitigated to their satisfaction. Thus,
in the interest of having claims paid as promptly as possible
and obtaining expeditious judicial review, the importer and
surety should be permitted the option of electing to protest
the assessment of liquidated damages and, if denied, the op-
tion of paying the liquidated damages and commencing a suit
in the CIT for a refund, as well as merely waiting to be sued by
the U.S. government.
II. WHICH EVENT TRIGGERS THE RUNNING OF THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS GOVERNING SUITS
COMMENCED PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.
§ 1582(2)?
It is well settled that the statute of limitations governing
actions brought by the United States to recover liquidated
damages on a bond "shall be barred unless the complaint is
filed within six years after the right of action accrues." 56 An
55. Seeking mitigation or relief does not preclude an importer or surety from
concurrently pursuing the protest route to judicial review in the event they do not
obtain satisfactory administrative relief. But cf. Farrell Lines, Inc. v. United States,
657 F.2d 1214, 1218 (C.C.P.A. 1981), as modified by denial of reh'g, 667 F.2d 1017
(C.C.P.A. 1982). Thus, the "mitigation" route and the protest route are not mutually
exclusive.
56. 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) (1988); see United States v. Reul, slip op. 90-92 (Ct. Int'l
Trade Sept. 12, 1990), petition for reh 'gpending; United States v. Peerless Ins. Co., 703
F. Supp. 955, 956 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988); United States v. Angelakos, 688 F. Supp.
636, 637 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988), dismissed on remand (Ct. Int'l Trade Nov. 15, 1990);
United States v. Continental Seafoods, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 1481, 1483 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1987), vacated and dismissed per stipulation on remand (Ct. Int'l Trade Nov. 30, 1988); Di
Giorgio v. United States, 8 CIT 192, 197 n.9 (1984); United States v. Atkinson, 575
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unsettled issue, however, is the event from which the six-year
statute runs.
The CIT has indicated that the actual breach of the bond
upon which the suit is predicated is the event which triggers
the statute. In United States v. Reul,57 United States v. Peerless In-
surance Company,5" and United States v. Atkinson,59 where suits by
the U.S. government were based upon an importer's failure to
timely redeliver merchandise to Customs pursuant to a de-
mand for redelivery, the CIT held that the statute commenced
when the time expired for the importer to redeliver the mer-
chandise.60 In United States v. Angelakos6' and United States v.
Continental Seafoods, Inc. ,62 where the suits were premised on the
importer's failure to timely comply with a notice of refusal is-
sued by the FDA and Customs, the CIT held that the statute
ran from the date on which the time to comply with that notice
expired.63
The determination that the statute runs from the date of
the breach appears to be based upon the statement in Atkinson
that "[i]t is a general rule that 'the statute of limitations begins
to run on the date that a cause of action for breach accrues,
F. Supp. 791, 794 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983); United States v. Bavarian Motors, Inc., 4
CIT 83, 87 (1982).
57. Slip op. 90-92 (Ct. Int'l Trade Sept. 12, 1990), petition for reh'g pending.
58. 703 F. Supp. 955 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
59. 575 F. Supp. 791 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
60. In Atkinson, the notice of redelivery provided that the importer was required
to redeliver the merchandise within five days of the mailing of the notice. Id. at 793.
The court held that the bond was, therefore, breached when the merchandise was not
redelivered within five days of the mailing of the demand. Id. In Peerless, a later case,
the CIT made essentially the same determination, but took notice of the U.S. govern-
ment's contention that the bond was actually breached on the sixth day after the
demand, when the time to redeliver had expired. Peerless, 703 F. Supp. at 958. In
many of the current cases involving notices of redelivery, the importer is given thirty
days to redeliver, as opposed to five. See, e.g., Reul, slip op. 90-92 (Ct. Int'l Trade);
United States v. Monza Automobili, 683 F. Supp. 818 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988). Thus, it
appears that under the reasoning of Atkinson and Peerless, the statute of limitations in a
suit based upon the failure to timely redeliver merchandise would commence run-
ning on the thirtieth or thirty-first day after the mailing of the demand for redelivery.
61. 688 F. Supp. 636 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988), dismissed on remand (Ct. Int'l Trade
Nov. 15, 1990).
62. 672 F. Supp. 1481 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
63. Angelakos, 688 F. Supp. at 637; Continental Seafoods, 672 F. Supp. at 1483. In
Angelakos, the CIT noted that since the notice of refusal provided that the importer
had ninety days to comply, the breach did not occur until the ninety-first day. Since
suit was brought within six years of the ninety-first day, the CIT held that the suit was
not barred by the statute of limitations. Angelakos, 688 F. Supp. at 637.
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which is ordinarily the time of the breach of the agree-
ment.' "I Inasmuch as it was not an issue in that case, how-
ever, the Atkinson court overlooked the precise wording of sec-
tion 2415(a),65 which does not state that the statute runs from
the accrual of the breach or the accrual of the "cause of ac-
tion," but rather from the accrual of the "right of action. "66
Although the terms "right of action" and "cause of ac-
tion" are often used interchangeably by the courts, in actuality
the terms have different meanings. 67 Generally, a "cause of ac-
tion" is defined as the facts or events that entitle a party to
bring and maintain an action or, in other words, the "wrong"
that is sued upon.68 A "right of action" is the right to institute
a suit or enforce a claim.69 Thus, a "right of action" accrues
when all conditions precedent to suit have been met,70 which
may occur at the same time or a later time than the wrong, or
breach, itself.7'
64. United States v. Atkinson, 575 F. Supp. 791, 794 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
65. 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) (1988).
66. Id.
67. See IA CJ.S. Actions § 21, at 365-68 (1987).
68. BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 182-83 (3d ed. 1969). A "cause of action" is
defined as "[tihe fact or facts which establish or give rise to a right of action, in other
words, give to a person a right to judicial relief." Id.
69. Id. at 1119. A "right of action" is defined as
[t]he right to bring suit in a particular case. A present right to commence
and maintain an action at law to enforce the payment or collection of a debt
or demand .... Precisely, the right of the plaintiff to sue, the essentials of
which are (1) a good cause of action; (2) the performance of all conditions
precedent; and (3) the existence of the right to maintain the action in the
plaintiff unaffected by circumstances which will constitute in law a bar to the
maintenance of the suit.
Id. "A cause of action is to be distinguished from right of action. A right of action is
the right to enforce presently a cause of action, that is, a remedial right; a cause of
action, on the other hand, is the operative fact or facts which give rise to a right of
action." Id. at 182-83.
70. 28 U.S.C. § 2632(a) (1988). Section 2632(a) provides that
[e]xcept for civil actions specified in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, a
civil action in the Court of International Trade shall be commenced by filing
concurrently with the clerk of the court a summons and complaint, with the
content and in the form, manner, and style prescribed by the rules of the
court.
Id.; see Border Brokerage Co. v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 1389, 1390 (Cust. Ct.
1974) (holding that in context of section 2632(a), "denial of protest, in whole or in
part, creates a 'right of action' ").
71. See generally A. STEARNS, THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP § 8.23 at 280-89 (5th ed.
1972). In discussing the applicable statute of limitations to suretyship law, the author
states that
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To comply with the terms of the ordinary Customs impor-
tation bond, a demand for payment of liquidated damages
must be properly made prior to collection of the damages.72
Thus, a condition precedent to a suit to collect liquidated dam-
ages for breach of a bond is the mailing of a notice of demand
for liquidated damages, and the "right of action" (or right to
sue) does not accrue until the demand for the liquidated dam-
ages is mailed. In accordance with the precise wording of the
statute of limitations, therefore, which provides that the statute
commences when the "right of action" accrues, the statute
would not start running until a demand for the payment of liq-
uidated damages is mailed to the importer and/or surety.
The proposition that the statute is not triggered until the
demand for payment has been made has been advanced before
the CIT in Peerless and Angelakos. Inasmuch, however, as both
cases were commenced within six years of the actual breach,
which breach was caused by the failure to timely redeliver the
merchandise to Customs, neither case reached the issue of
whether the statute actually started running at the later date on
which the demand for payment of the liquidated damages was
mailed.
The CIT in Angelakos did raise, however, an interesting
que5tion of whether, assuming the mailing of the notice of liq-
uidated damages triggered the statute, Customs could indefi-
nitely delay the running of the statute of limitations by not
sending a notice of liquidated damages.73 A similar issue was
raised in Continental Seafoods, in which the argument was made
[tihe usual form of the statute [of limitations] is that the action must be
brought within the period of limitation after the 'cause of action accrues.'
The statutes do not undertake to define when the cause of action accrues,
and judicial construction of this important right has not been uniform in this
country. For the most part, it is assumed that the limitation commences to run from the
date the obligor is liable to suit.
Id. (emphasis added).
72. 19 C.F.R. § 172.1(a) (1990).
73. United States v. Angelakos, 688 F. Supp. 636, 637 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988),
dismissed on remand (Ct. Int'l Trade Nov. 15, 1990). This same possibility arises if the
statute runs from the date the notice of redelivery is issued, since the issuance of that
notice is also within the control of Customs. The Angelakos court, however, in finding
that the statute ran from the expiration of the time to comply with a notice of redeliv-
ery, apparently found no difficulty with the statute running from that event, notwith-
standing the fact that the issuance of the notice of redelivery was also within the
control of Customs. Id. at 638.
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by defendants that the failure to comply with a notice of refusal
could not start the statute of limitations running because the
U.S. government could thereby arbitrarily delay the running of
the statute by not sending the notice. There, the CIT rejected
that argument, stating that
[i]f the government fails to issue the requisite notice, then a
cause of action for failure to export under Customs' super-
vision will not lie. Additionally, the Court, contrary to de-
fendants' intimations, does not presume that the govern-
ment will deliberately withhold the notice of refusal of ad-
mission (assuming the goods do not qualify for admission)
once notice of detention has been given. 74
Moreover, the event precipitating the running of a statute
of limitations is frequently one that is provided for in the con-
tract, in addition to events under the control of the creditor
such as notice and/or demand for redelivery, performance,
and payment. 7 5 Events under the creditor's control have often
been held to trigger the statute of limitations, notwithstanding
the fact that the creditor is capable of delaying the statute by
failing to perform the triggering event. 76
Furthermore, it has generally been held that where a de-
mand is necessary to the bringing of an action, that demand
must be made within a "reasonable" amount of time.7 7 While
a "reasonable" amount of time has been held to depend upon
the particular circumstances of each case as it arises, the judici-
ary has often held a "reasonable" time to be, "by analogy, the
74. United States v. Continental Seafoods, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 1481, 1484 n.3
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1987), vacated and dismissed per stipulation on remand (Ct. Int'l Trade
Nov. 30, 1988).
75. 54 CJ.S. Limitations of Actions, §§ 95 & 131, at 134-38, 175 (1987) (citing
relevant cases).
76. See, e.g., United States v. Reul, slip op. 90-92 (Ct. Int'l Trade Sept. 12, 1990),
petition for reh'g pending; United States v. Peerless Ins. Co., 703 F. Supp. 955 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1988); United States v. Angelakos, 688 F. Supp. 636 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988),
dismissed on remand (Ct. Int'l Trade Nov. 15, 1990); United States v. Lun May Co., 680
F. Supp. 1573 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988), dismissed on remand (Ct. Int'l Trade Feb. 28,
1990); United States v. Continental Seafoods, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 1481 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1987), vacated and dismissed per stipulation on remand (Ct. Int'l Trade Nov. 30, 1988); Di
Giorgio v. United States, 8 CIT 192 (1984); United States v. Atkinson, 575 F. Supp.
791 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983); United States v. Bavarian Motors, Inc., 4 CIT 83 (1982).
77. See, e.g., Reul, slip op. 90-92; Peerless, 703 F. Supp. 955; Angelakos, 688 F.
Supp. 636; Lun May, 680 F. Supp. 1573; Continental Seafoods, 672 F. Supp. 1481; Di
Giorgio, 8 CIT 192; Atkinson, 575 F. Supp. 791; Bavarian Motors, 4 CIT 83.
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period fixed by the statute of limitations for the commence-
ment of the particular action involved." 78
To date, the decided cases in the CIT have not been faced
with a fact pattern in which suit was not instituted within six
years of the actual breach. Therefore, there has been no deci-
sion rendered regarding the possibility of later events trigger-
ing the statute. When such a fact pattern arises, however, the
CIT may have to squarely confront the issue of whether the
statute is actually triggered by the breach of the bond or by the
demand for payment.
III. THE EFFECT OF LIQUIDATION ON BOND LIABILITY
FOR LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
A number of cases instituted in the CIT involved a fact
pattern similar to that in scenario 2, in which imported food-
stuffs were released conditionally to the importer under a
bond, the entry was liquidated by Customs, the FDA subse-
quently determined that the merchandise was inadmissible,
and a notice of refusal was issued to the importer by Customs
and the FDA. Upon the failure to redeliver and/or export or
destroy the merchandise in accordance with the FDA determi-
nation that the merchandise was inadmissible, Customs deter-
mined that the bond was breached and assessed liquidated
damages. 9
A defense urged in many of the cases instituted to collect
liquidated damages under section 1582(2) was that the liquida-
tion constituted the final determination regarding the admissi-
bility of merchandise, that once the entry was liquidated, it was
deemed admissible, and that Customs, by liquidating the entry,
forfeited its right to enforce a subsequent decision to refuse
78. 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 95, at 136; see A. STEARNS, supra note 71,
§ 9.33 at 349 (stating that prevailing rule is that demand be made within reasonable
amount of time and "where no demand is made, the law generally presumes a de-
mand after a lapse of time equal to the statutory limitation").
79. See, e.g., United States v. Utex Int'l, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 250 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1987), rev'd, 857 F.2d 1408 (Fed. Cir. 1988); United States v. Angelakos, 688 F. Supp.
636 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988); United States v. Lun May Co., 680 F. Supp. 1573, 1575
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1988); United States v. Continental Seafoods, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 1481
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1987); United States v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 680 F. Supp.
1569 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
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admission.8" Under that reasoning, the Bond was not
breached, and liability was discharged.
The U.S. government pointed out that liquidation, as de-
fined in the Customs law, involves only the final computation
of duties or drawback accruing on an entry,8' and does not af-
fect another agency's determination with respect to the admis-
sibility of merchandise. The decision regarding whether food
is admissible is thus within the statutory power of the FDA, not
Customs, and Customs cannot, by liquidating an entry, affect
the admissibility of contaminated food.
The CIT, in a series of cases starting with Utex, agreed
with the U.S. government's position. 82 The Federal Circuit,
however, reversed the trial court's judgment in Utex.83
A. The Resolved Issue: The Effect of Liquidation on Bond Liability
When Liquidation Occurs Prior to the Issuance of a Notice
of Refusal or Notice of Redelivery
The appellate court in Utex agreed that the determination
of admissibility of foodstuffs was within the discretion of the
FDA, riot Customs, but found that Customs, as the enforce-
ment arm of the FDA, had the duty of suspending the liquida-
tion of the entry until the decision on admissibility was made.84
Based upon the determination that liquidation affects all as-
pects of an entry including admissibility, the court held that
since the liquidation occurred prior to a notice of refusal (or,
by analogy, prior to a demand for redelivery), 85 the merchan-
80. See, e.g., United States v. Toshoku Am. Inc., 670 F. Supp. 1006 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1987), rev'd, 879 F.2d 815 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Utex, 659 F. Supp. 250.
81. 19 C.F.R. § 159.1 (1990); see supra note 25 (discussing liquidation, penalties,
and failure to suspend liquidation).
82. Toshoku, 670 F. Supp. 1006; Utex, 659 F. Supp. 250; Angelakos, 688 F. Supp.
636; Lun May, 680 F. Supp. 1573; Continental Seafoods, 672 F. Supp. 1481; American
Motorists, 680 F. Supp. 1569.
83. United States v. Utex Int'l Inc., 857 F.2d 1408 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
84. Utex, 857 F.2d at 1411 (reversing 659 F. Supp. 250 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987));
see supra note 23 (containing text of 19 C.F.R. § 159.55(a)). In Utex, the U.S. govern-
ment had acknowledged that, in light of the regulation, liquidation prior to the ad-
missibility decision was premature, but posited that the legal consequence of a pre-
mature liquidation by Customs was not to void the determination by another agency
that the merchandise was inadmissible. Utex, 857 F.2d at 1412.
85. Utex, 857 F.2d at 1412; see 19 C.F.R. § 141.113(f) (1990) (providing that "de-
mand for the return of merchandise to Customs' custody shall not be made after the
liquidation of the entry covering such merchandise has become final").
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dise was deemed admissible, and liability for the failure to ex-
port, destroy, and/or redeliver the merchandise was termi-
nated.86
B. The Unresolved Issue
The effect of liquidation on bond liability when the liqui-
dation occurs subsequent to the issuance of a notice of refusal or
demand for redelivery, but prior to the expiration of the time
to comply, remains unresolved. This significant issue was
raised in Utex but left open by the court. The precise situation
was at issue in Toshoku,87 which was pending in the Federal Cir-
cuit at the time Utex was decided. 8 Inasmuch as "liquidation"
was not central to the case, the appellate court did not fully
address the issue and Toshoku was ultimately decided on other
grounds. The Toshoku court did, however, state that
It]he parties have not argued that the finality of liquidation,
see United States v. Utex Int'l, Inc., 857 F.2 d 1408 (Fed. Cir.
1988), is applicable in this case. Here the [n]otice of
[r]efusal... was issued prior to the erroneous liquidation of
the entry by Customs. See Utex at 1409 (obligations vested
prior to liquidation are not comparable to post-liquidation
obligations (distinguishing United States v. American Motorists
Ins. Co., 10 CIT 19,1986 WL 8339 (1986))).89
In light of this statement, it appears that the Toshoku court
determined that a liquidation occurring subsequent to a notice of
refusal (or a notice of redelivery) does not discharge bond lia-
bility for failure to comply with the notice, notwithstanding
that the liquidation occurred prior to the importer's compli-
ance with the notice.90
86. Ufex, 857 F.2d at 1414.
87. United States v. Toshoku Am., Inc., 670 F. Supp. 1006 (Ct. Int'l [rade
1987), rev'd, 879 F.2d 815 (Fed. Cir. 1989). In Toshoku, the entry was liquidated sev-
enteen days after the notice of refusal was sent, and prior to the date the notice and
demand for liquidated damages was issued. Id. at 1007.
88. Oral argument in Toshoku was heard subsequent to the Utex decision, and the
liquidation issue, in light of the Utex decision, was addressed in the argument.
89. United States v. Toshoku Am., Inc., 879 F.2d 815, 816 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
90. Support for this position is also found in a Customs regulation which pro-
vides that suspension of liquidation is required only until the decision is made with
respect to admissibility. 19 C.F.R. § 159.55(a) (1990). It does not require any fur-
ther suspension of liquidation. ld; see supra note 23 (containing text of 19 C.F.R.
§ 159.55(a)).
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A number of cases are currently pending administratively
with Customs in which the entry was liquidated shortly after
the issuance of a notice of refusal or notice for redelivery. The
CIT, therefore, may be faced with the issue in the near future.
IV. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
AND PENALTIES
Liquidated damages are assessed when a condition of a
bond is breached. Thus, the assessment of the damages is in-
tended to serve as a deterrent to non-compliance. 9' Because
of this deterrent effect, importers and/or sureties have urged
that liquidated damages are actually a penalty, and that, ac-
cordingly, the statute of limitations for penalties should govern
suits instituted under 28 U.S.C. § 1582(2).92 Additionally,
they argue that prejudgment interest should not be assessed,
inasmuch as prejudgment interest is not assessed upon puni-
tive damages. Both contentions have been rejected by the fed-
eral courts.
A. Liquidated Damages Are Not Considered Penalties for Purposes of
the Statute of Limitations
It has been judicially determined that 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a),
the six-year statute of limitations for money damages founded
upon a contract, is the statute of limitations governing cases
commenced pursuant to section 1582(2) to collect liquidated
damages.93 It has also been argued, however, that the gov-
erning statute of limitations should be the five-year statute for
penalties. 94 This contention was expressly considered and re-
91. United States v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 680 F. Supp. 1569, 1573 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1987).
92. See Di Giorgio v. United States, 8 CIT 192, 196-97 (1984).
93. United States v. Reul, slip op. 90-92 (Ct. Int'l Trade Sept. 12, 1990), petition
for reh'g pending; United States v. Peerless Ins. Co., 703 F. Supp. 955, 957 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1988); United States v. Bavarian Motors, Inc., 4 CIT 83, 87 (1982).
94. 19 U.S.C. § 1621 (1988). Section 1621 provides:
No suit or action to recover any pecuniary penalty or forfeiture of property
accruing under the customs laws shall be instituted unless such suit or ac-
tion is commenced within five years after the time when the alleged offense
was discovered: Provided, That in the case of an alleged violation of section
1592 of this title arising out of gross negligence or negligence, such suit or
action shall not be instituted more than five years after the date the alleged
violation was committed: Provided further, That the time of the absence from
the United States of the person subject to such penalty or forfeiture, or of
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jected by the CIT in Di Giorgio v. United States,95 in which the
CIT held that "[s]ection 1621 relates to penalty-type proceed-
ings, such as those pursued by the United States under 19
U.S.C. § 1592 (1982), ' 96 but that actions involving a claim or
counterclaim by the United States for liquidated damages for
breach of a bond are founded upon contract, and thus are gov-
erned by the statute applicable to actions for money damages
by the United States.97
B. Liquidated Damages Are Not Considered Penalties for Purposes of
Awarding Prejudgment Interest
The second context in which it has been urged that liqui-
dated damages function as a penalty has been in the area of
prejudgment interest. This argument was unequivocally re-
jected by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in
United States v. Imperial Food Imports,98 which held that liquidated
damages assessed for breach of a bond did not function as a
penalty for purposes of awarding prejudgment interest.99 Im-
penal acknowledged that prejudgment interest may not be
awarded on punitive damages, but held that liquidated dam-
ages are not punitive "if they are reasonable and the exact
amount of the damages sustained would be difficult to
prove."' 00
The court then addressed the liquidated damages at issue:
The liquidated damages assessed in this case were reason-
able. Customs assessed US$220,749.00 in liquidated dam-
any concealment or absence of the property, shall not be reckoned within
this period of limitation.
Id. (emphasis in original).
95. 8 CIT 192 (1984).
96. Id. at 197.
97. Id. The Di Giorgio court stated that it is "settled that section 2415(a) applies
when the United States, as plaintiff, seeks recovery for liquidated damages arising
from the breach of an importation bond." Id. at 197 n.9 (citing United States v.
Bavarian Motors, Inc., 4 CIT 83, 87 (1982)). In Bavarian Motors, the CIT had rejected
the contention that the action was governed by the three-year statute of limitations
for claims founded in tort, 28 U.S.C. § 2415(b) (1978), on the ground that the action
arose out of the breach of a surety bond by the importer, and that suretyship arises in
contract, not tort. Bavarian Motors, 4 CIT at 87.
98. 834 F.2d 1013 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
99. Id. at 1016. In Imperial, a bond was breached by the failure of an importer to
redeliver contaminated foodstuffs to Customs. Id. at 1015.
100. Id. at 1016.
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ages, representing the value of the merchandise plus esti-
mated duties, after the importer failed to destroy or export
the non-admitted goods. Moreover, the exact amount of
damage sustained by the importer's failure to remove food-
stuffs that in most instances were adulterated by the pres-
ence of insect and rodent filth would be difficult to prove.
Therefore, we conclude that the liquidated damages
awarded in this case were not punitive.1
The CIT emphasized that the prejudgment interest was in-
tended to compensate for the delay in payment and not to
punish.' 02 The court relied on the reasoning of its earlier case
in United States v. Goodman,'0 3 in which it held that because the
U.S. government had lost the use of the funds to which it was
entitled, the failure to award prejudgment interest would, in
effect, amount to an interest-free loan to the defendant.'0 4
One issue in the "land of liquidated damages" thus appears
settled, that liquidated damages assessed for breach of an im-
portation bond are distinguishable from "penalties."




The CIT and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit have recognized that there is no statutory authorization
for an award of prejudgment interest to the U.S. government
in actions brought under section 1582(2),105 and that such an
award therefore lies within the discretion of the CIT as part of
its equitable powers.i °6 The courts have also held that where
101. Id. (citation omitted).
102. Id.
103. 572 F. Supp. 1284 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
104. Id. at 1289; see United States v. Imperial Food Imports, 834 F.2d 1013,
1016 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
105. There is, however, statutory authorization for prejudgment interest in suits
to recover import duties. 19 U.S.C. § 580 (1988). Section 580 provides that "[ulpon
all bonds, on which suits are brought for the recovery of duties, interest shall be
allowed, at the rate of 6 per centum a year, from the time when said bonds became
due." Id. The court, however, in its discretion, may award additional prejudgment
interest in appropriate cases, even where interest under section 580 is available. Cf.
Imperial, 834 F.2d at 1016; Goodman, 572 F. Supp. at 1289.
106. Imperial, 834 F.2d at 1016; Goodman, 572 F. Supp. at 1289-90. The Goodman
court also held that "it appears equitable that prejudgment interest should be calcu-
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prejudgment interest is compensatory, it should ordinarily be
awarded absent some specific justification for withholding it.'0 7
In light of the recent affirmation in Imperial that liquidated
damage awards in section 1582(2) cases are compensatory in
nature, it is clear that prejudgment interest is appropriate to
compensate the United States for its lost use of funds. Gener-
ally, where the U.S. government has prevailed in actions based
upon section 1582(2), the CIT has awarded discretionary pre-
judgment interest.° 8
More controversial than the issue of whether prejudgment
interest should be awarded at all, however, is the determina-
tion of the event from which the prejudgment interest should
run. The CIT has selected various events from which to award
prejudgment interest, °9 including the date the payment of es-
timated duties was first due;" the date of the breach, i.e., the
expiration of the time for the importer to timely redeliver mer-
lated on the basis of the rate provided in 28 U.S.C. § 2644 (in accordance with 26
U.S.C. § 6621), since that is the rate which Congress determined would adequately
compensate an importer for the loss of use of its money where duties are erroneously
assessed." Goodman, 572 F. Supp. at 1290. That rate has been generally followed by
the court where prejudgment interest has been granted. Postjudgment interest has
generally been calculated in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1961. See, e.g., Imperial, 834
F.2d at 1016.
107. See, e.g., United States v. Reul, slip op. 90-92 (Ct. Int'l Trade Sept. 12,
1990), petition for reh'g pending; General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648
(1983); United States v. Imperial Food Imports, 660 F. Supp. 958 (Ct. Int'l Trade),
aff'd, 834 F.2d 1013, 1016 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc. v. Nicolet
Instrument Corp., 807 F.2d 964 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 915 (1987);
Leinoff v. Louis Milona & Sons, Inc., 726 F.2d 734, 743 (Fed. Cir. 1984); United
States v. Monza Automobili, 683 F. Supp. 818 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
108. See, e.g., Imperial Food, 660 F. Supp. 958; MonzaAutomobili, 683 F. Supp. 818;
United States v. Toshoku Am., Inc., 670 F. Supp. 1006 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987), rev'd,
879 F.2d 815 (Fed. Cir. 1989); United States v. Utex Int'l, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 250 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1987), rev'd, 857 F.2d 1408 (Fed. Cir. 1988); United States v. Angelakos,
688 F. Supp. 636 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988), dismissed on remand (Ct. Int'l Trade Nov. 15,
1990); United States v. Lun May Co., Inc., 680 F. Supp. 1573, 1575 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1988), dismissed on remand (Ct. Int'l Trade Feb. 28, 1990); United States v. American
Motorists Ins. Co., 680 F. Supp. 1569 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987), appeal dismissed (Fed. Cir.
1988); United States v. B.B.S. Elec. Int'l Inc., 622 F. Supp. 1089 (1985).
109. Many of these cases were ultimately reversed, vacated, or settled in light of
the Federal Circuit's substantive decisions in Utex and Toshoku. The appellate court,
however, did not reach the issue of interest or the findings in the CIT with respect to
prejudgment interest. Therefore, the event from which the interest should run, pro-
vides guidance on the issue of whether prejudgment interest should be awarded.
110. See United States v. Goodman, 572 F. Supp. 1284 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
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chandise pursuant to a notice of redelivery;.. the date the de-
fendant's administrative petition for mitigation or relief was
denied;' 1 2 the date the demand for payment was made upon
the surety subsequent to denial of the mitigation petition;" t 3
the date the final demand upon the surety was made, subse-
quent to mitigation proceedings being completed;" t4 the date
mitigation proceedings were completed and the defendants
had received several demands for payment;" t5 the date the fi-
nal administrative demand for payment was made;" 6 and, at
the farthest end of the scale, the date the suit was instituted." 17
111. United States v. Reul, slip op. 90-92 (Ct. Int'l Trade Sept. 12, 1990),petition
for reh 'g pending.
112. See United States v. Utex Int'l, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 250 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987),
rev'd, 857 F.2d 1408 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Angelakos, 688 F. Supp. 636.
113. See United States v. Monza Automobili, 683 F. Supp. 818 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1988).
114. See United States v. Toshoku Am., Inc., 670 F. Supp. 1006 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1987), rev'd, 879 F.2d 815 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
115. See United States v. Continental Seafoods, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 1481 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1987), vacated and dismissed per stipulation on remand (Ct. Int'l Trade Nov. 30,
1988).
116. See United States v. Imperial Food Imports, 660 F. Supp. 958 (Ct. Int'l
Trade), aff'd, 834 F.2d 1013 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The U.S. government did not file a
cross-appeal in Imperial, and absent a cross-appeal, the U.S. government could not
ask for a better judgment than it obtained in the CIT. Thus, there was no issue
before the Federal Circuit with respect to whether the CIT erred in not awarding
prejudgment interest from an earlier date. The Federal Circuit merely held that the
CIT did not abuse its discretion in awarding interest from the date it had selected.
Imperial, 834 F.2d at 960.
117. See United States v. Lun May Co., Inc., 680 F. Supp. 1573, 1575 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1988), dismissed on remand (Ct. Int'l Trade Feb. 28, 1990); United States v.
American Motorists Ins. Co., 680 F. Supp. 1569 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987), appeal dismissed
(Fed. Cir. 1988). In certain cases, the CIT determined that the lapse of time between
a formal demand for damages and the institution of suit was a factor to be considered
in selecting the date from which prejudgment interest should run. Those cases failed
to address the fact, however, that exhaustive mitigation and collection proceedings
typically occur between those dates. Thus, a failure to award prejudgment interest
prior to institution of suit in effect punishes the U.S. government for taking the time
to consider petitions for mitigation and/or relief to make extensive collection efforts
administratively, rather than proceeding immediately to court to negotiate a possible
settlement with the defendants prior to commencing suit.
In Monza, in which the sole issue was prejudgment interest, the CIT did appar-
ently take cognizance of these factors in that it held that a "two year period after the
final demand date does not constitute excessive delay on the part of the [U.S.] gov-
ernment in instituting this proceeding," and that if it were to deny prejudgment in-
terest for those two years, the defendant would have had an interest-free loan of the
money during that time, which clearly would be an inequitable result. Monza, 683 F.
Supp. at 820; see United States v. Reul, slip op. 90-92 at 6 (Ct. Int'l Trade Sept. 12,
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Notwithstanding the wide range of events from which the
CIT has awarded discretionary prejudgment interest, however,
Imperial's affirmation that the interest is compensatory in na-
ture suggests that the purpose of awarding the interest would
be best effectuated by granting it from the date the liquidated
damages first became due, since the U.S. government lost the
use of the money from that date." 8
Inasmuch as a demand for payment of liquidated damages
is a condition precedent under the Bond for obtaining pay-
ment, the interest should run, for purposes of making the U.S.
government whole, at least from the mailing of that first de-
mand for payment,' 9 which also happens to be the event that
commences the time for filing a protest against the assessment
of the damages.' 20 As one scholar states:
Interest normally commences to run against the principal
from the date that he violates his obligation and, since the
surety is liable for the principal's entire debt, he will be lia-
ble also for such interest on the debt. Where demand is neces-
1990) (holding that Customs did not erroneously delay in bringing suit six years after
breach occurred), petition for reh 'g pending.
118. Thus, under the reasoning of Imperial, it appears that, although the selec-
tion of the event from which prejudgment interest runs is discretionary, the primary
factor for the court to take into consideration in exercising that discretion is the com-
pensatory nature of the award. Based upon Imperial's holding that prejudgment in-
terest is intended to compensate, not function as a penalty, the Monza court found
that, while the complexities of the substantive issues and defenses might be relevant
to liability on the merits, those factors were not relevant to liability for prejudgment
interest. By contrast, the CIT in American Motorists apparently found that the com-
plexity of the case and the defendants' possible "good faith" miscalculations regard-
ing their liability were factors to be weighed in determining the date from which
prejudgment interest should run. See American Motorists, 680 F. Supp. at 1573. It is
urged that, while the complexity of issues and "good faith" beliefs of defendants
might be relevant if the liquidated damages functioned as a penalty, they are not
relevant where interest is merely intended to make the U.S. government whole.
119. Moreover, since the importer and/or surety have been obtaining interest
on the liquidated damages since the demand for the liquidated damages, the granting
of prejudgment interest to the U.S. government from that date does not damage the
importer or surety. It merely prevents them from becoming unjustly enriched.
120. See supra notes 29-55 and accompanying text (discussing right to protest
assessment of liquidated damages). In several cases, the court has awarded prejudg-
ment interest from the date of the last demand, rather than the first formal demand.
The demands subsequent to the first formal demand, however, merely represent fol-
low-up collection efforts, and the fact that they may be characterized as final does not
alter the formality and protestability of the first demand. The finality expressed in
the subsequent collection efforts merely represents the persistence of the U.S. gov-
ernment's collection official.
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sary, a surety upon a bond is liable for interest upon the damages
ascertained from the date of the demand.' 2
In light of the compensatory nature of prejudgment inter-
est to be paid upon liquidated damages, fairness and equity
demand that the interest should run at least from the date the
first notice and demand for payment was mailed, since it is
from that date that the U.S. government lost the use of the
funds it was owed.
CONCLUSION
For the moment we leave the "land of liquidated dam-
ages." Some of the initial debris of unresolved legal issues has
been removed or repaired; some has been merely relocated;
while other impediments, previously unforeseen or unnoticed,
have suddenly appeared.
This Article has discussed only five of the issues that have
been the subject of litigation in the CIT in suits by the U.S.
government to recover liquidated damages for breach of a
bond. In light of the many unresolved issues, however, and
the myriad and sometimes creative defenses urged by import-
ers and sureties, it is clear that the "land of liquidated dam-
ages" will continue to be a source of prolific and significant
litigation in the CIT in the future.
121. A. STEARNS, supra note 71, § 8.19 at 283 (emphasis added).
